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A b s t r a c t
In this paper1 I examine the growth of regulatory policy in the European Union 
(EU) and review the initiatives for "better regulation" undertaken by European 
institutions. The main argument is that EU initiatives have been cast in a rather 
narrow conceptual framework, limited to issues such as simplification and 
"better law-making". Although important, these issues are only a component of 
the wider task of governing regulation. Therefore I introduce and discuss three 
proposals for re-casting the debate on EU regulation. First, the focus should be 
shifted from "better /aw-making" to "better regulatory policy-making". In 
essence, this corresponds to a shift from a legalistic conceptualisation to issues 
of single-market governance. Second, regulatory management, rather than 
simplification, should represent the strategic objective of EU institutions. Third, 
regulatory reform should be accompanied by administrative reform. 
Consequently, the relative impenetrability of the Commission to administrative 
reform represents a serious obstacle to regulatory reform.
1 Translated by Iain L. Fraser. I wish, without involving them in anything I have written, to 
express my gratitude to three Commission officials who were kind enough to supply material 
and discuss the issues of simplification in the European Union with me. Given that the 
Commission has been defined by Stevens and Stevens (1996: 11) as "male dominated", I am 
particularly delighted to thank two women and one man: Donatella Soria (Secretariat 
General), Ana Gallo Alvarez (DG XV) and David Lawrence (DG XXIII). I wish, finally, to 
thank Scott Jacobs, who heads the Public Management Division (PUMA) of the OECD, for 
discussing on several occasions the results achieved by the OECD and their implications for 
the European Union. Giuliano Amato kindly supplied several suggestions on a preliminary 
draft of the text. An earlier version of this paper appeared (in Italian) in S. Cassese and G. 
Galli (eds) L ’ltalia da semplificare: le istituzioni, Bologna, II Mulino, 1998.























































































































































































Not only does the European Union (EU) face the well-known democratic 
deficit, it is also challenged by a less known, yet substantial, management 
deficit (Metcalfe 1996). On the one hand, the growth of EU regulatory policies 
entails costs that have not been adequately governed. To cite one figure, the 
total costs borne by European firms every year to meet European Union 
regulations have been estimated at a figure of between 150 and 250 billion Ecus 
(Single Market News, April 1996). This cost has to be set against the efficiency 
gains and the fairness of a "level playing field" that sound regulatory policies 
yield for the society as a whole. However, for a single company and the 
individual, a rule is often a cost in terms of adjustment, compliance, and 
administrative burden.
On the other hand, governing European regulatory policies calls for wider 
goals. Indeed, an effective regulatory system requires -  as will be shown below 
-  a reinvention of the EU administration, particularly of the European 
Commission, and a new way of thinking about the rules affecting citizens and 
firms in the single market. This means that the theme of governing regulation 
taps into the wider issue of the single market governance. As such, it may prove 
decisive for the legitimacy of the European institutions.
This paper covers the two sides of regulatory policies (as a cost to be reasonably 
contained, and as a fundamental component of the governance of the single 
market) by raising the following questions:
• How and why is European regulation growing?
• What are the main proposals for governing EU regulatory policy?
• How have the Union’s institutions, primarily the European Commission, 
equipped themselves to simplify rules and produce better regulation?
• Considering the distance still to run, what suggestions can be made?
The first question is tackled by conceptualising the European Union as a 
political system with a comparative advantage in the production of regulatory 
policy (Majone 1996). Once this relative specialisation has been explained, the 
following question arises: what problems do European rules create, in terms of 
quantity and quality? To answer that, I shall retrace the debate, starting in the 
early 1990s, on subsidiarity, simplification and ‘better law-making’. Various 
member states and European interest groups have produced studies, suggestions 
or proposals that will be considered in brief, before going on to a critical review 




























































































One of my arguments is that both the debate and the initiatives have defined the 
problem, all in all, restrictively. The key issue has been how to improve EU 
legislation, but not how to govern regulatory policy. As argued below, treating 
the problem as one of law-making instead of regulatory governance yields a 
substantial difference in the type of issues tackled and the choice of 
instruments. For the question is not just "how much to regulate", but also "why 
to regulate", "how to administer existing regulation", and, ultimately, "how to 
govern the regulatory policies" of a multi-level political system like the EU. The 
concluding section will show the implications of a wider conceptualisation. I 
shall argue that the EU should go beyond legislative techniques, set objectives 
of regulatory management (and not just of simplification, which in a relatively 
"new" political system is not the most important problem either) and link 
regulatory reform to the administrative reform of the Commission.
1. THE REASONS FOR REGULATORY GROWTH
One error to avoid in conceptualising the European Union is to think in state- 
morphic terms. The EU is in fact not following, and probably will not, the 
typical trajectories of political development of the nation-states as we have 
known them in Western Europe. Not only is there (by comparison with the 
nation-state) a discontinuity in terms of institutional development (parliament, 
government and bureaucracy radically change form and substance as we move 
from national to union level), but specialisation in terms of types of public 
policies is very different too. While the nation-states developed and 
consolidated around distributive and redistributive policies (in brief, welfare 
and taxation policies), the EU - as Giandomenico Majone’s studies have shown 
- has chiefly developed the regulatory dimension. Both the limited Community 
budget and the jealously held national powers in terms of social and tax policies 
have in fact prevented the growth of a European Welfare state.
Using the nation state as benchmark, the EU would seem entirely 
underdeveloped. But turning the attention to types of public policy, it can be 
easily seen that the EU is a political system specialised in the production of 
regulation. Even EU policies that, at first glance, seem typical features of an 
embryonic European Welfare state, such as social policies and direct taxation, 
are in fact policies containing rules. In the former case (social policy), rules that 
govern the labour market (Majone 1996), in the latter (taxation) rules that 
restore the neutrality of fiscal instruments by avoiding international double 




























































































One can explain the growth of regulation at the European level in various ways. 
Following Majone, for instance, one can argue in terms of demand and supply 
(Majone 1996). On the demand front, European firms often consider with 
favour the adoption of a single European rule instead of fifteen, so as to be able 
to speak to the rest of the world with a single voice. At the origins, then, EU 
regulation is bom as an exercise of drastic simplification and reduction of 
transaction costs in the single market. For the member states, the Union’s 
regulatory policies are a response to those problems that cannot be solved by 
mere inter-governmental agreements.
A further factor is that the costs of European regulation are not undergone in the 
first instance by the governments. Indeed, firms and citizens have to pay the 
costs of adapting to a directive, let us say, on pesticides, or toy manufacture, or 
safety belts. This factor should be borne in mind, since it is representatives of 
national governments that sit on the Council. At the Council level, political 
agreement is easier where, in the first instance2, firms and citizens pay 
adjustment costs. The proof is that in sectors where costs are paid directly by 
states (as with the abolition of double taxation on company profits, a measure 
that directly hits national revenues), Europeanization has been very limited 
(Radaelli 1997).
To complete the demand picture, it should be added that in some circumstances 
countries accept EU public policy as a way to get out of politically difficult 
national situations. These are the circumstances where European measures are a 
useful scapegoat, a way of avoiding direct political responsibilities in difficult 
areas like cutting back industries with excess capacity (Smith 1997) or 
structural readjustment of public finance (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). 
Summarising, the external obligation adequately protects governments from the 
accusation of seeking to penalise their own citizens and firms.
Continuing with the metaphor of demand for and supply of regulation, the 
Commission, as explained by Majone (1996), is in a formidable position in the 
‘supply’ of regulation. The EU budget constraint bars the development of 
distributive and redistributive policies (since social policy programmes require 
large sums of money), but to write a rule that, say, lays down requirements for 
engaging in credit or for international mergers and acquisitions, the only 
resource needed is a thorough knowledge of the markets and the subjects to be 
regulated. The Commission is, without a shadow of doubt, one of the
2 This emphasis is important. For it is well known that when it comes to implementing EU 
policies, governments and public administrations often find themselves facing costs. What we 





























































































bureaucracies where cognitive resources are most developed, to the point of 
often bringing it criticism for its technocratic tendencies. As far as the 
relationship with the subjects regulated is concerned, the very numerous 
working groups that meet every day at the Commission have extended the 
network of interactions. The Commission, moreover, like all bureaucracies, is 
oriented towards expanding its own powers (Majone 1996). The mission to 
promote and deepen European integration is even laid down in the Rome 
Treaty, and this is what is referred to when the Commission is spoken of as the 
‘engine for integration’3. Analysts of European public policies, finally, have 
highlighted the Commission’s role as policy entrepreneur, a term designating a 
political subject capable of opportunistically exploiting and ‘entrepreneurially’ 
utilising the scarce resources at its own disposal in order to create new policies 
(Cram 1997).
But it is from this very entrepreneurial virtue that the flaws start to be seen. A 
first aspect is that this system of incentives to regulatory growth should also be 
considered from a more problematic viewpoint than Majone does. One could 
raise the question whether demand and supply of regulation could lead towards 
excessive ‘production’. Are we in the presence of too much European 
regulation? Is the subsidiarity principle de facto exceeded by the Commission’s 
daily entrepreneurial action? If so, who pays the costs of the excessive 
disequilibrium in the market for regulation? Should the EU regulatory system 
be radically simplified?
Further, the growth of regulation - apart from the points raised by Majone - can 
also arise from a manifest political asymmetry of the European political 
system.4 At the national level, a minister of the environment willing to propose 
environmental policy rules has to deal, within the government, with his or her 
colleagues for industry, commerce and agriculture. These colleagues will assert 
the needs not to put too heavy a burden on companies, shops and farmers. Other 
colleagues in the treasury will preside over the economic compatibility of the 
proposals and therefore will press the minister proposing new environmental 
rules with requests for cost-benefit analysis. At national level, then, there is a 
political mechanism - the collegiate action of government - that brings a 
plurality of interests inside the policy formation process. If, however, the 
hypothetical environment minister decided to operate at European level, he or 
she would have to convince only his or her environment ministers from the 
other member states. It is certainly true that the proposals have to come from the 
Commission, which seeks, operating in collegiate fashion, to weigh the various
3 But see the limits to this mechanistic metaphor pointed out by Metcalfe (1992).




























































































demands and interests, but at the Environment Council it is only the 
environmental ministers who are in charge of the final decision. This asymmetry 
leads to a systematic bias towards the growth of regulation.
Nonetheless, simplification is an excessively reductive way of framing the 
debate. A broader topic, systematically neglected, is that of governing 
regulation. How are the regulations produced to be administered? The 
Commission’s culture is totally biased towards policy entrepreneurship, 
whereas its management capacities are so reduced that some authors have 
written of a management deficit (Metcalfe 1992; 1996; Laffan 1997). The 
Commission has a high performance at ‘invention’: it formulates new ideas and 
solutions, launches proposals for new public policies, is often at the frontier of 
the new policy paradigms and best practices. However, its performance in terms 
of ‘innovation’, i.e. in terms of management processes that convert new ideas 
into practice and ensure effective implementation, are disappointing (Metcalfe 
1992). Put differently, the Commission’s leadership in the policy formation 
process is not accompanied by adequate management of institutional 
innovation.
On top of this comes a ‘legalistic’ mode of thinking. More often than not, EU 
public policy is equated with law-making, without at the same time asking 
whether the necessary management capacities are ready to support the 
legislative powers (Metcalfe 1996). Or, what is still worse, it is imagined that 
the only capacities needed are those of centralized type. By contrast, governing 
complex systems like European regulatory policies requires capacities - often 
necessarily decentralised - for leading and administering networks (Metcalfe 
1992).
The Commission, faced with the challenge of moving from hierarchical powers 
to horizontal capacities, finds itself in a difficult position. Since its origins the 
Commission has been a hierarchical organization, vertically segmented into 
sections (the Directorates General, DGs) with slight capacities for horizontal 
intra-organizational control. The difficulties met with in producing a culture of 
budgeting and evaluation in the individual DGs are clear proof of this (Laffan 
1997). In many areas, from the regulation of ownership in the mass media to 
special tax regimes, problems which by their nature cut across the whole 
Commission are initially parcelled out at the level of an individual DG. Cini 
observes that this step (that is, ‘who is to hold the file’) can be very problematic. 




























































































DGs see the possession of the proposal as part of a larger policy strategy’ (Cini 
1996:153)5.
Once dossiers have been allocated to a DG and proposals have been fleshed out 
by the competent service, drafts are laboriously co-ordinated at the collegiate 
level of the Commissioners, so as to arrive at a more or less consistent line for 
the Commission as a whole6. One reason for this difficulty is that finding an 
equilibrium within the Commission also means satisfying the various policy 
options and differing models of capitalism. But another, and fundamental, sore 
point is that while the wind of administrative reform has swept through more or 
less all the countries in the OECD area, the Commission has to date remained 
impenetrable to the instruments and the culture of new public management.6
But the question is by no means confined to internal co-ordination in the 
Commission as a complex organization. Outside the Commission, as already 
mentioned, the main problem is governing implementation structures ranging 
from Brussels down to regional and local levels. With limited human resources 
(the Commission’s staff is slightly bigger than the one of an ordinary city 
municipality) and an implementing process over which Brussels officials in any 
case have no direct powers (with the partial exception of competition policies), 
the quality of European regulation depends on multi-organizational 
implementing structures. And it depends particularly on the capacity to govern 
through collaboration, not hierarchy. If, for instance, there is a European 
regulation whereby pharmaceuticals can be marketed only if ‘safe’ and 
‘effective’, consensus must then be created among the administrations of fifteen 
different countries about what those two terms mean in practice (Dehousse 
1997:251). In this context the Commission cannot and should not act alone. 
Metcalfe has argued that while firms ought to aim at ‘competitive advantage’, 
overcoming the management deficit calls for building up a ‘collaborative 
advantage’ (Metcalfe 1996:5). Yet the Commission has shown poor capacity for 
monitoring and managing implementation structures.
One consequence is that states such as Germany, faced with the lack of 
uniformity among the various countries in terms of implementation, are pressing
5 For an analysis of such a struggle over the media ownership dossier see Harcourt (1998).
6 Timmermans (1997:6), of the Commission legal service, argues that discussion among the 
various chefs de cabinet supplies "a serious horizontal scrutiny of subsidiary, proportionality 
and, in certain respects, quality of drafting". However, this statement is over-optimistic. In 
reality it often happens that the Commission, given the hierarchical, compartmentalized way 
in which dossiers are distributed, finds enormous political difficulties in arriving at a clear 
collective option.




























































































for increasingly detailed directives, thereby contributing to over-regulation 
(Dehousse 1997). The question of over-production of rules thus does not (as a 
simplistic rhetoric would suggest) exclusively concern the inclination of 
‘Brussels mandarins’ to harmonize everything possible (once The Economist 
wrote that the Commission’s attitude was: ‘if it moves, harmonize it!’, 21 March 
1992), but is interwoven with the poor performance in terms of implementation.
Concluding this examination, political incentives (demand and supply of 
regulation) lead to the relative specialization of the Union in the production of 
European regulatory policy. The system of incentives is such that regulatory 
policies whose costs fall in the first instance upon firms rather than on states are 
more developed than others. The growth in regulation raises problems that do 
not just concern simplification but involve internal co-ordination within the 
Commission, the management deficit and implementation failures. Tackling 
these problems properly calls for an approach in terms of public policies, not 
just of legislation. It remains to seen, then, whether the debate between political 
and institutional actors has treated these issues sufficiently broadly, and whether 
the initiatives taken in the 1990s are able to cope with the challenges of 
governing regulation.
2. THE DEBATE 
2.1. The key issues
The debate on governing European regulation has evolved around the question 
of the ‘quality’ of European legislation7 and ‘better law-making’8 . The very 
terminology brings out how the debate on EU regulatory policies risks being 
levelled down into one on mere legislative techniques. But before considering 
this aspect, we must consider what are the key issues in the political and 
institutional debate. We will then turn to the initiatives taken by EU institutions, 
often in response to precise criticisms made by the member states and the 
business community.
The pressure for a critical rethinking of European regulation has a starting 
point, i.e., the tormented process of the Maastricht Treaty ratification. In this
7 The quality of internal market legislation was the theme of an important international 
conference promoted by the Dutch government during its six-month Union presidency (23-25 
April 1997) with the explicit aim of influencing the intergovernmental conference.
8 This is the title of the annual report of the Commission on the application of the principles of 





























































































period, at the Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 the British 
presidency put the question of regulatory production on the agenda. But what 
are the most important studies and the issues which have been raised since the 
Edinburgh Council? In very general terms, the most-felt political concern has 
been to ensure that EU rules proceed appropriately and proportionately in 
relation to the objectives, without going beyond the guiding principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The countries that have pushed hardest in this 
direction have been Germany, Holland (Koopmans Report 1995) and the United 
Kingdom. For France the Conseil d’Etat has intervened in the debate. The 
business community has presented a document of analysis and proposals, the 
Unice report on regulation (1995)9. EU institutions have produced the 
Sutherland Report on the internal market (Commission 1992), which had inter 
alia the merit of stressing the need for administrative partnerships between the 
Commission and public administrations, and the report by a group of 
independent experts (set up by the Commission) on legislative and 
administrative simplification (the so-called Molitor Report, Commission 1995).
What are the problems raised by these studies? Summarising, the following key 
issues have been identified:
• As already hinted, the lack of respect for the principle of subsidiarity, and 
hence excessive centralization. The EU political system is much more recent 
than the nation-state ones, so that one cannot blame the EU for over­
regulation (Normenflut) in absolute terms, especially bearing in mind, for 
example, the figure of some 150,000 laws existing in a country such as Italy7. 
Compared with national production, the EU legislative stock is modest in 
bulk. This does not alter the fact that in some circumstances there can be 
over-regulation in the sense of European rules going beyond the subsidiarity 
principle. For instance, Germany asked the Commission to give an account of 
a list of measures incompatible with the subsidiarity principle10 . The 
Koopmans Report (1995:15) also cites the case of such detailed rules (as in 
the case of the directives on hazardous substances) as to take away all room 
for the national political systems in transposition and implementation. As 
previously mentioned, certain directives suffer from excessive detail.
9 It should be noted that the Unice Report does not confine itself to considering European 
Union rules, but also includes national regulation. Similarly, the 1998 three-volume study 
funded by the Italian confederation of industry (Confindustria) is mainly, although not 
exclusively, concerned with regulation and regulatory reforms at the national level (see 
Cassese and Galli 1998).
7 On regulatory inflation in Italy and estimates regarding the number of laws existing in this 
country see Cassese and Mattarella (1998).




























































































• Lack of clarity and invisible legislation. Not only are EU rules hard to 
interpret, but the lack of explanatory memorandums on certain proposals 
makes the policy formation process opaque (Koopmans Report 1995:10). 
Moreover, some decisions, communications and recommendations are not 
published, so that we are in the paradoxical position, as the Conseil d’Etat 
has noted, of being governed by invisible legislation. Many decisions on state 
aids, to give only one example, have never been published, so that it is 
impossible to know the reason for certain special fiscal regimes. Clarity is 
also endangered by a growing confusion between directives and regulations, 
and by certain acts with uncertain legal status, like the Council’s 
‘resolutions’, the Commission’s ‘communications’, the ‘directions’, and the 
‘codes of conduct’. There are two reasons for this lack of clarity. First, the 
Community legal system is based on the combination of elements, concepts 
and notions ‘imported’ from national systems that differ greatly among 
themselves. Second, EU rules result from a process of inter-governmental 
negotiation where reasons of diplomacy and political compromise have the 
upper hand over those of law.
• Accessibility. Codified texts are often lacking, and this makes it particularly 
hard to access the legislation. The rules of the Common Agricultural Policy 
are a thicket of decisions stratified over time and repeatedly amended and 
adjusted. For this reason too, getting a clear picture of the rules in force in a 
given sector, in the absence of codification, may prove a very hard 
undertaking.
• The Achilles heel of many European rules is poor performance in the 
implementing stage. Sometimes this depends on poor preparation and lack of 
commitment by national administrations and legislators, but other times the 
flaw is in the origin: the rules have been badly thought up and drafted, 
without asking what implementing difficulties might arise. Moreover, the 
European Court of Auditors reports have shown the presence of massive 
fraud" , from the 61 per cent of projects for inter-regional collaboration 
between Eire and Northern Ireland that have no inter-regional nature at all to 
the 88.9 million Ecus spent by Greece to fund courses for civil servants rather 
than for unemployed youths (Court annual report for 1994). In short, the 
criticism is that that scant attention is dedicated to the drafting of ‘fraud- 
proof’ rules. As already seen, the implementation problem is in fact even 
broader, calling for capacities to manage administrative networks and 
partnerships among diverse organizations. 1
11 According to the European Court of Auditors 1996 Report, published in November 1997, 




























































































2.2. The proposals from member states, employers' organizations and 
experts
Faced with these criticisms, member states, employers' organizations and 
groups of independent experts (such as the group chaired by Molitor, 
Commission 1995), have put forward a variety of proposals. I shall start by 
considering the proposals, then look at how the EU institutions have equipped 
themselves, and then, in a later section, assess the proposals presented.
A first series of proposals is of a managerial nature. The Unice Report 
(1995:55) proposes devolving responsibility for the whole regulatory process to 
a single Commissioner. Currently, co-ordination of the process is handled by 
the Commission Secretariat General (Article 15 of the Rules of Procedure). 
Decisions taken by written procedure cannot go further until there is a 
favourable opinion from the legal service. Another co-ordination mechanism 
(this is sometimes, indeed, a mechanism that brings out very sharp conflicts) is 
the Commission’s collegiate procedure on the basis of which proposals for 
directives must be supported collectively by the Commissioners. Furthermore, 
the Commission has internal rules that require various services (DG XI, XIX 
and XXIII) to consult each other when preparing impact analyses.
A second series of proposals concerns the need to harness the rule-making 
procedure within a single set of guidelines. The Koopmans Report points out 
that machinery of this type exists in the various EU institutions, starting with 
the Commission and Council. However, the Report maintains, this is 
‘fragmentary and rather inconsistent’ machinery (Koopmans Report 1995:38). 
Hence the suggestion to harmonize the guidelines for Community legislation, 
with particular attention to the criteria already highlighted in the Sutherland 
Report, namely necessity, efficacy, proportionality, consistency and 
communication. The Koopmans Report recommends an inter-institutional 
agreement ensuring the applicability of the harmonized guidelines to all the 
institutions (Commission, Council and European Parliament).
A second series of options is of a more political nature. An idea floated by the 
French Conseil d’Etat, taken up by the Koopmans Report and pushed 
(unsuccessfully) by the Dutch EU Presidency at the inter-governmental 
conference in 1997 is to create a body of ‘guardians of the rules’ that could 
perhaps take the shape of a ‘European Conseil d’Etat’. In a milder version, this 
body could be limited to a consultative body somehow linked with the 
European Court of Justice. In short, in one way or another, an independent legal 
review body would be created: a group of independent experts able to choose a 




























































































Report 1995:46-47). The idea is to make this body capable of intervening at the 
stage where the Commission sends a proposal to the Council and the European 
Parliament. In its more institutionalized form, that is, the ‘European Conseil 
d’Etat’, EU treaties would need amendment. This was what the Dutch 
government was aiming at in the first six months of 1997, but after the 
conclusion of the inter-governmental conference this prospect has been shelved, 
at least until the next inter-governmental conference where treaties will be 
discussed again. In the shape of a small consultative committee of wise men, the 
proposal could be taken up again at any time, even though it cannot be seen - to 
anticipate my assessment - how a body of this nature could make its mark on 
such a complicated policy process as the EU one.
A third argument aired in the debate is the necessity to simplify in order to 
promote growth and employment. This is an argument of high political profile, 
although its implications in terms of concrete initiatives are not clear and 
beyond dispute. The Molitor Report (Commission 1995) links administrative 
simplification to growth in employment, even if, as noted by the Commission 
(SEC 95, 2121 final, 29 November 1995), the experts headed by Molitor have 
not done specific analyses but merely postulated the aforesaid link. There are, 
however, a variety of economic studies available on the theme (Koedijk and 
Kremers 1996). The thorny question is giving content to this strategy. The 
Molitor Report, indeed, contains a number of proposals, but some of these 
proposals have generated disagreement even within the expert group itself, as 
indicated by the ‘dissenting opinions’ at the end of the report. For instance, the 
Report suggests that in order to simplify industrial relations some fundamental 
rights of workers directly applicable in member states ought to be inserted in the 
Treaties. This proposal has been accused of being contradictory with the aim of 
simplifying the functioning of the single market.
Finally, a fourth series of proposals concerns codification, seen as an instrument 
to improve the accessibility of EU legislation (Commission 1997b). 
Conventionally, formal codification, on the basis of which the codified text 
contains the rules previously included in a variety of texts concomitantly 
abrogated, is distinguished from informal consolidation, where for 
documentation purposes legislative texts that still continue to be fully in force 
are brought together in a single volume. This is an area where the EU 
institutions have moved through an inter-institutional agreement between 
Council, Parliament and Commission to speed up codification12. On the basis of 
this agreement, the Commission presents a codification proposal which is then 
considered by a consultative working group made up of representatives of the




























































































three institutions’ legal services. If this group considers that the Commission, in 
its proposal, has not gone beyond the limits of codification (that is, considers 
that the legislation whose codification is being proposed is not essentially 
altered), then Parliament and Council apply a simplified decision procedure. By 
April 1997, the consultative group had considered fourteen proposals which, 
were they adopted, would lead to the elimination of 215 acts (Timmermans, 
1997:19). This result is hardly exciting, but it should be borne in mind that, as 
Timmermans notes, the need to include Swedish and Finnish since the last 
enlargement of the Union has made the work of translation still more 
complicated. But codification has already brought us within the sphere of the 
initiatives taken by the EU institutions (especially the Commission), to which 
we shall now turn our attention.
3. INITIATIVES OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS
What has been the response of the European institutions to the criticisms and 
the suggestions? In this section I shall first consider the initiatives of a macro­
political nature. Second, I shall review the programmes and actions undertaken 
by the Commission, with special reference to simplification of the internal 
market and to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
As mentioned above, the starting point for the road to Community 
simplification was the Edinburgh European Council, where the principle was 
laid down that specific decisions should be taken regarding clearer, simpler 
legislation truly respectful of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity - 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, article 3b - requires asking, before creating 
a Community rule, what is the actual Community dimension of the problem, 
what is the most effective solution given the means available to the Union and 
to member states, and what is the real added value of Community action by 
comparison with isolated action by member states (Commission 1993).
One of the elements of the macro-institutional framework within which the 
action of simplifying and improving the quality of legislation is taking shape is 
represented by the inter-institutional agreements. The one on codification has 
already been mentioned. The accelerated working method enshrined in this 
agreement undoubtedly has a potential. This potential, however, has not been 
entirely expressed to date. On 25 October 1993, the Union’s three main 
institutions (Council, Parliament and Commission) initialled an agreement on 
the subsidiarity principle. The agreement on subsidiarity contains two main 
ideas: (a) the Commission undertakes to justify its own legislative initiative in 




























































































an annual report intended to show how the Commission has conformed with the 
subsidiarity principle. The Commission presented two reports on subsidiarity, in 
1993 and 1994, while since 1995 the annual report has been extended from 
subsidiarity to the wider issue of ‘better law-making’ (Commission 1996). In 
the same vein of general political commitments to ‘better law-making’ is the 
Council resolution of 8 June 1993 (OJ C 166 93/C) on the quality of legislative 
drafting. This resolution has been followed by guidelines on law-making and 
checklists on the quality of legislation.
Another step in the direction of general political commitments was made with 
the Amsterdam Treaty. The Treaty devotes an entire chapter to the quality of 
Community legislation and one to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The Amsterdam Treaty encourages EU institutions to arrive at a 
common agreement on guidelines. This invitation seems to correspond with one 
of the proposals put forward in recent years, that is, to have fairly similar 
guidelines for the three main EU institutions13 14. The Treaty, moreover, taking 
account of the Union’s institutional development in the 1990s, includes the 
Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee among the 
addressees of the Commission’s annual report on subsidiarity. The aim is to 
expand the political debate on what the Commission does from year to year, 
using the annual report as an engine for learning mechanisms among the EU 
institutions. Finally, the conclusions of the Amsterdam European Council (16 
and 17 June 1997) set at the centre of the debate the question of simplifying the 
administrative environment in which SMEs operate. Accordingly, the 
Commission is requested to set up a task force to do this job. Hence the 
Business Environment Simplification Task Force (Best), which has focused so 
far on questions of the administrative and fiscal constraints on recruitment of 
new staff, training, access to research and technology and relations with credit 
and finance institutions.
The same European Council supplied political support to the Commission’s 
Action Plan for the Single Market14 . The plan lists four strategic objectives: 
making the rules more effective, dealing with market distortions, removing 
barriers to market integration, and finally ensuring an internal market that 
benefits all citizens of the Union15. The quality of rules, accordingly, has now 
become one of the four strategic goals for the completion of the single market 
by 1999. Alongside specific initiatives on simplification, reviewed below, the 
action plan has also brought in the ‘scoreboard’ for member states’ degree of 
compliance with the internal market, a measure strongly advocated by
11 One possibility, as mentioned, is to arrive at an appropriate institutional agreement.
14 Document CSE (97) 1 final, 4 June 1997.




























































































Commissioner Monti to help make member states more responsible in this 
area16.
To complete the macro-political picture, it should be noted that the European 
institutions have agreed17 that simplification ought not to encroach on the so- 
called acquis communautaire. In essence, simplification is to be prevented from 
acting as a passkey to calling in question again harmonization reached in sectors 
like health protection, worker and consumer protection, environmental policy 
and free trade. Simplification - this is the idea - should become a resource for 
completing the internal market, not for dismantling it.
Apart from macro-political initiatives, the Commission has also developed a 
series of initiatives that can be fitted into the following categories:
• guidelines for preparing legislative proposals and intensifying consultation;
• ex ante impact assessment of proposed legislation, with especial attention to 
SMEs;
• self-limitation of legislative activity (less legislative initiatives and 
consideration of alternatives to regulation);
• simplification and ex post evaluation of existing rules.
Following the OECD experience18 , the Commission has equipped itself with 
various instruments for the ex ante analysis of legislative proposals, such as 
checklists, rules of procedure, the legislative drafting manual and the 
compendium on ‘information, communication and openness’. The point, 
though, as clearly recognized by President Santer’s memorandum on General 
Guidelines for Legislative Policy - SEC(95) 2255 - is that once the principles 
have been fleshed out there are still a number of steps to be taken in order to be 
ensure that these principles are being correctly and systematically applied. 
President Santer’s guidelines insist on the need for ‘legislative texts to be of a 
quality and consistency of their own, for the drafting procedure to be open, 
planned and co-ordinated and for monitoring and assessment to be more 
incisive’. The memorandum suggests consistency (closer respect for the rules, 
including those on co-ordination among services), rationalization of impact
16 By 1 November 1997 there were 359 (out of a total of 1339) internal market directives not 
implemented by European countries (25 per cent of the total). The most critical sectors are 
transport (60 per cent unimplemented), public procurements (55.6 per cent), and industrial and 
intellectual property (50 per cent).
17 See Commission (1993) and the Council resolution of S July 1996 ( OJ 224/03 96/ series 
C ) .




























































































assessment, systematic evaluation of EU regulation, possibly even in its 
secondary effects, and more intense consultation with interested parties.
As for the checklists, the Commission has laid down the following principles. 
To begin with, a clear justification and the objectives of the proposals for new 
EU law must be spelled out. The Commission is also obliged to stick to 
simplicity of presentation, to prefer simplicity of rules whenever possible, to 
respect subsidiarity and proportionality, to promote (rather than hinder) 
consistency with other Community policies, to legislate only after extensive 
consultation, to produce impact assessment, to check on fraud risks, and to 
think through the main financial implications (including administrative 
resources, when needed). Finally, the use of ‘white papers’ and ‘green papers’ 
as means of consultation to stimulate the widest possible debate is highly 
recommended19.
The actions identified by the Santer memorandum are a fairly faithful reflection 
of the Commission’s present problems in governing regulation. To start with, 
the DGs still have a very imperfect degree of co-ordination among themselves. 
Typically, this is one the key causes of low quality of EU regulation. Second, ex 
ante assessment of costs and benefits for SMEs is far from being fully 
satisfactory, as recognized by the Commission legal service itself (Timmermans 
1997:13) and by DG XXIII (Schulte-Braucks 1997). The European Parliament 
has also intervened on this issue, asking the Commission to give official (i.e., 
legal) status to business impact assessment. The most frequent criticism is that 
the Commission, though thefiche d'impact was introduced as long ago as 1986, 
does not follow the “think small first” philosophy when preparing new 
proposals for directives. Third, systematic evaluation of regulatory policies is 
still limited: to anticipate one conclusion, more often than not policy evaluation 
is limited to financial controls. To put it differently, evaluation is 
conceptualised as a component of budgetary control, whereas it should be 
widened to include the comprehensive analysis of the results achieved by EU 
regulatory policies.
SMEs are possibly the weakest entity in EU regulatory policies. A series of 
studies (Commission 1997a) estimates that the average cost of the 
administrative burden on SMEs is six to thirty times higher than for bigger 
firms. The Commission has recently drawn up a recommendation (Commission 
1997a) to simplify the procedures for starting up a new firm. However, this is 
essentially a recommendation addressed to member states. The different
19 According to the Report Better Law Making 1996 (Commission 1996) in the first eleven 




























































































problem of simplifying the regulatory environment created by the cumulative 
effect of Community rules is instead still far from satisfactory solution. DG 
XXIII is currently engaged in reviewing the techniques of regulatory impact 
analysis. One of DG XXIII’s main ideas is to stress the “think small first” 
philosophy, and raise at the very preparatory stage of EU proposals the question 
whether they are compatible with SMEs. If they are not, the procedure should 
be to consider thresholds below which the proposed regulatory policies do not 
apply, or alternatively introduce specific derogations for SMEs (Schauter- 
Braucks 1997). As in other cases, the internal fragmentation of the Commission 
is a serious hurdle. Different DGs draw up draft directives in themselves 
perfectly compatible with the objectives and administrative culture of a 
particular DG (for instance an environment protection proposal drawn up by 
DG XI), but compatibility with SMEs needs (presided over by DG XX11I) is by 
no means ensured. The question of bringing the “think small first” philosophy 
into proposals of each and every DG is closely bound up with the internal co­
ordination mechanisms. The by no means heavyweight position of DG XXIII 
(which tends to be regarded as a much less powerful DG than others) does not 
help the cause of SMEs. Thinking of the future, specific measures for 
monitoring the impact of legislation on SMEs should arise from the third multi­
annual programme for SMEs in the EU - COM(96) 98 final - forwarded to the 
Council on 22 March 1996, which covers the years from 1997 to 2000.
More encouraging results come from the slowdown imposed on legislative 
output (Commission 1997b). One very interesting indicator is the number of 
proposals withdrawn for being incompatible with subsidiarity principles, or 
because they are technically obsolete, or finally because they are not politically 
acceptable. In 1993 the Commission withdrew 150 such proposals, in 1996 48, 
and in 1997 30 (Commission 1997b). It should be noted, however, that these 
figures include both proposals withdrawn because of their incompatibility with 
the subsidiarity principle and initiatives presented long ago and simply lying 
before the Council with no political interest shown by member states. Various 
proposals for tax co-ordination, for example, have been withdrawn not because 
they violate subsidiarity, but because of lack of political will at the Council 
level.
There is also a fall over time in new legislative initiatives presented by the 
Commission. In 1990 there were 185, in 1994 only 51 (Commission 1994; 
Laffan 1997). In 1997 the Commission stopped at 7 new legislative proposals. 
However, the figure is destined to rise for 1998, given the major reforms under 




























































































1997b:2)22 . This tendency seems to reflect one of President Santer’s slogans, 
‘less but better law-making’. Undoubtedly, by comparison with Jacques Delors’ 
political entreprenurship, the Santer Presidency is at pains to show the relevance 
of, as another slogan puts it, ‘putting the common house in order’.
Recently, alternatives to legislation have also been explored. One example is the 
agreement negotiated with the European industry on environment policies 
(Commission 1996:3), the codes of conduct (like the on tax competition among 
member states* 8) and forms of self-regulation by both sides of industry offered 
by the Maastricht Social Protocol.
The ex post monitoring and evaluation of Community legislation is structured 
into a variety of projects and initiatives including codification and the SLIM 
programme (Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market). Codification has 
already been mentioned, and here it is worth noting that this work is only in its 
infancy. Further, what is called informal consolidation is nothing but an 
exercise in mere publication in volumes (usually series C of the European 
Community Official Journal) of regulations that have appeared at various 
periods in time. The object of the exercise is to provide easy-to-access 
documentation. The Commission has however launched more incisive projects, 
known as recasting. Through recasting the Commission intends not just to 
rationalize what already exists in a single text, but also to review the regulations 
and suggest appropriate amendments to the Council. In 1996 changes were inter 
alia proposed to the Television Without Frontiers Directive (89/552/EEC), to 
the norms on agricultural tractors (which at the moment include a framework 
directive and 23 directives), and a recasting of directive 88/379/EEC on the 
classification, labelling and packaging of hazardous preparations. However, 
these amendments to existing legislation have to go through the EU policy 
process, with the same political obstacles that new directives have to face at the 
Council level.
Recasting and codification are not the only ways old legislation can be 
eliminated and hence the EU regulatory environment simplified. The 
Commission has thus undertaken to remove legislation rendered obsolete by the 
principle of mutual recognition, by technical progress, by the Court of Justice’s
22 It should be noted that the Commission has made only seven proposals for new legislation, 
but also 34 proposals for ‘continuation of measures’ by other means, 23 proposals for revising 
legislation, 88 implementing measures and 183 proposals regarding international relations 
(Commission 1997b: 12).





























































































case law and by the ‘new approach’ based on minimum common standards to 
which mutual recognition rather than harmonization applies.
Turning to pilot projects on simplification, one interesting experiment is the 
SLIM initiative23 . With SLIM the Commission means to show that practical 
results in terms of simplification can be achieved. The quantitative importance 
(in the sense of the number of regulations considered) of SLIM is actually 
slight, but as with all pilot projects the object is to create a ‘demonstration 
effect’, that is, to indicate a working method that can supply appreciable results. 
The SLIM method is based on three main ideas:
• choice of specific work areas (the four projects completed concern Intrastat, 
ornamental plants, mutual recognition of qualifications, and technical 
regulations in the building industry);
• small working groups. Each of the working groups that finished their work in 
1996 consisted of a chair appointed by the Commission, an equal number 
(four or five) of representatives of member states and the industries 
concerned (in some cases including representatives of SMEs and consumers) 
and a number of Commission officials with observer status. The limited 
number of participants meant that the working groups did not become mere 
inter-governmental committees with the fifteen states fully represented. 
Instead, the groups facilitated a co-operative working method among experts;
• a limited period of time to work out problems and bring forward solutions 
referring to a clear simplification objective.
The results of the SLIM method are encouraging, and show how participation 
can help to solve problems in specific cases. In addition, the methodology of 
consensus-building intrinsic to the working groups has been of great value. 
However, one should not ignore the qualifications to this successful experience. 
First, the Commission needs political support from the member states in order 
to go beyond the first four projects and bring the SLIM methodology under full 
steam. Political support came from the Council, which in March 1997 agreed to 
the Commission’s request to extend SLIM. However, the Belgian, Italian and 
Portuguese delegations put a damper on enthusiasm by declaring, as reported by 
Agence Europe (no. 6936, 17-18 March 1997), that simplification should not 
become a way of dismantling Community legislation. Frankly this is not a likely 
danger, given that the SLIM working groups operate with an eye to solving 
problems in limited, clearly defined areas.




























































































But the Council’s political support is essential for another reason too. Once 
their job is done, the working groups make a series of proposals. If the 
Commission accepts them, they must still go before the Council for the normal 
process of Community law-making. The SLIM groups are laboratories for 
building consensus among member states, the industries concerned and the 
Commission, but it is the Council that ultimately has to decide on the proposals. 
It would be naive to assume that consensus reached on the working groups can 
automatically be extended to the Council. But to see this one need only await 
the outcome of the proposals drawn up by the first working groups that have 
already completed their work.
Another puzzle lies in the pre-conditions for the success of SLIM. To date 
SLIM has been a feather in the cap for DG XV, competent for the internal 
market, in the area of simplification. However, in order to extend the SLIM 
methodology, other DGs should embrace the philosophy of the programme. 
There is no way to simplify the rules on industrial policy, research and 
development or environment without involving other DGs. Recent signals tend 
to suggest that getting the message throughout the entire Commission is 
anything but easy. What is happening in the Commission is a sort of Nimby 
(Not In My Backyard) phenomenon: ‘simplify everywhere, but not in my DG!’. 
The officials competent for industrial policy (DG III) have already indicated 
their doubts about the creation of SLIM working groups on policies within their 
domain24 . These are episodes that bring out the typical intra-bureaucratic 
conflict in complex organizations with high fragmentation and highly 
differentiated administrative cultures.
4. ASSESSMENT AND POLICY PROPOSALS
The simplification of EU regulation, the creation of user-oriented policy, and 
the modernization of the stock of rules represent a formidable task. The 
European Union, however, has two points of advantage by comparison with 
member states. First, the EU is a relatively ‘new’ political system, and therefore 
in quantitative terms EU rules do not even remotely emulate the age-old 
stratification of regulations in member states. Second, many of the Community 
rules, like those making up the so-called acquis communautaire, were originally 
introduced specifically to simplify, through a single European rule, a panoply of 
domestic rules distorting free trade and the free movement of labour and capital.




























































































Despite these positive features, serious problems still need to be tackled. EU 
institutions have operated with unequal success in the components of regulatory 
reform, and the search for innovative methodologies - such as SLIM - is still in 
hand, given the obstacles facing their spread. Moreover, proposals presented by 
member states are, taken together, limited. The idea of creating a European 
Conseil d’Etat is limited in a political sense, given that only a future inter­
governmental conference can amend the Treaties. But it is also limited in a 
technical sense since the risk exists that this body of ‘guardians of the rules’ 
may act either too soon or too late in the complex process of Community policy 
formation (Timmermans 1997). An opinion on the quality of legislation 
regarding a proposal for a directive supplied at the moment of presentation by 
the Commission might increase the complexity of the Community political 
process and have little influence on subsequent developments in Parliament and 
at the Council level. The Commission and Council legal services are probably 
in a better position to smooth out technical imperfections and suggest 
improvements in informal fashion and at any moment.
A European Conseil d’Etat might alternatively act in the last stage, but it 
remains hard to imagine how in the stages of tumultuous negotiations (and 
political agreements that remain secret) preceding adoption of a directive room 
can be left for a technical and legal assessment. There remains only the 
possibility of intervening through an examination of legislation once agreement 
has been reached on Council. However, at this point the whole exercise would 
amount to a sort of report on things already done, perhaps in reference to 
directives that have cost a lot in terms of political compromise and ought to be 
revised to take account of the opinion of the European Conseil d’Etat. Were the 
proposal for the European Conseil d’Etat instead downgraded to a committee of 
wise men, it is unclear what specific weight it might have. Committees of 
experts are all too numerous in the EU political system, and one new 
consultative body would have trouble becoming institutionalized.
As far as the tone of debate and the Commission’s initiatives are concerned in 
more general terms, their main weakness is an approach still limited to 
legislative issues rather than the broader goal of governing regulatory policies. 
Below I shall accordingly indicate some proposals for reformulating the debate 
on simplification and the quality of European regulation, divided into three key 
shifts: from legislation to the governing of regulatory policy; from 





























































































From legislation to public policy
Hitherto the problem of EU regulation has been defined essentially as one of 
legislation. Great attention has been paid to the design of new legislation, and, 
using methodologies like SLIM, to simplifying laws. But the really crucial point 
is whether and how EU regulatory policies are to be governed.
Treating regulation as a public policy means monitoring all stages of the 
process, from the design of directives to implementation and evaluation. The 
instruments needed are legislative technique, but also economic analysis, 
regulatory impact tools and systematic evaluation25. Not all difficulties can be 
anticipated at the design stage of legislation, so that there is a need to ensure 
control extended to national administrative practice and to the results actually 
achieved by regulatory policies. The editor of the journal Evaluation 
(no.2/1997), Elliot Stern, in his interview with Commissioner Liikanen, renders 
the idea well by stating that ‘public policies are like throwing a big stone into a 
pond to make circles’: it is only when the circles are there that you know what 
specific actions are possible and necessary.
Future thinking on regulation as public policy should proceed in two directions. 
First, the systematic evaluation of results reached by policies. Experience with 
regulatory review in some OECD countries (OECD 1997) indicates that the 
assessment of existing regulations, if well done, is not limited to considering 
technical legislative obsolescence but covers systematic measuring of the 
‘circles’, to keep to the metaphor, generated by public policy. Reconsidering the 
laws round a table, even with the aid of consultation processes, is not enough; it 
is better to measure what objectives have actually been reached by policies, also 
bearing in mind the unforeseen effects of public action. At the present stage, 
there is no evaluation culture extended to all Commission services 
(Vanheukelen 1995). Moreover, much of the evaluation done by the 
Commission is dominated by a financial-budgetary approach, whereas 
evaluation correctly understood goes beyond the question of efficiency (how 
financial resources have been employed) and asks about the efficacy of policies, 
that is, their capacity to reach objectives. Finally, cases where evaluation studies 
have tangible effect on the reformulation of policies remain rare (Vanheukelen 
1995:40). This means that the feedback on policy design generated by policy 
evaluation is still too slight* 27.
25 On policy evaluation, see inter alia Radaelli and Dente (1996)
27 It is interesting to note that Article 2 of the Financial Regulations on financial management 
requires the utilisation of evaluation studies in budget programming. On this point and the 




























































































Second, transparency and efficacy of regulatory policies can also be secured by 
removing some regulatory functions of the Commission and entrusting them to 
independent agencies. There are at present ten European agencies28 . Various 
merits are offered by the model of independent agencies at European level. 
Perhaps the most important comes from the experience with the internal market. 
From the Single European Act until now, experience has shown that it is not 
possible to create a market by just knocking down internal barriers to trade. The 
qualitative leap in fact needs substantive convergence of administrative action, 
be it, to take a few examples, the administration of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, implementation of the freedom of establishment, collaboration in 
indirect taxation, or even, looking beyond the internal market, implementation 
of the common policy on immigration.
However, the delegation of so many direct administrative powers to the 
Commission is politically inconceivable, and perhaps not even desirable 
(Dehousse 1997). The agency model, by contrast, represents an acceptable 
solution to the problem. Another point is that while Commission decisions are 
often highly politicized (think of the decisions on mergers and acquisitions) and 
marked by complex mediations among Commissioners, agency decisions are 
more protected from interference by political considerations and more attentive 
to considerations of efficiency. Another reason to support the development of 
regulation going beyond ‘the’ individual regulator (that is, the Commission) is 
that agencies base their reputation on the scientific correctness of the 
prerequisites for their action and on the dissemination of information (Dehousse 
1997)29. Conversely, inside the Commission checks on proposals being worked 
on are often devolved to the highly opaque network of the ‘comitology’ system, 
that is, the working groups where Commission officials and those from national 
public administrations work together (Pedler and Schaefer 1996). This network 
lacks the credibility and stability to instil a culture of ‘sound regulation’ and 
‘good communication’ into all those involved. To conclude on this point, in this 
case too I stress the difference between an approach in terms of legislation and 
one in terms of public policies. For the first approach, the discourse stops with 
the production of laws that remove the main barriers. There remains some way 
to go in this direction, as indicated by the Commission’s action plan for the 
internal market, but as the second approach warns, one should not ignore 
administrative issues in the governance of the internal market. These issues are 
well known to scholars working on EU public policy but so far have been
Commission's Management Control Chief Alan Pratley and Commissioner Liikanen, 
published in Evaluation in issue 2, 1995 and issue 2, 1997, respectively.
28 However, not all have regulatory tasks.
29 Dehousse notes that the dissemination of information as a strategic task goes as far as 




























































































neglected by the policy-makers engaged in the debate on the quality of EU 
regulation.
From simplification to regulatory management
Once conceptualized as public policy, regulation has to be governed. In this 
connection, the recent OECD report on regulation shows how various countries 
are at three different levels of development (OECD 1997). The first stage is that 
of deregulation: meaning simplifying, cutting away the legislative undergrowth, 
and liberalising markets. Deregulation, however, can act only on the past, not 
the future. Thinking of the EU, examples of deregulation are not lacking, even 
if typically EU action takes the form of deregulation followed by re-regulation, 
as indicated in the telecommunications, energy and mass media sectors. The 
SLIM programme is, in methodological terms, one of the most evolved 
examples of simplification.
A more advanced stage in governing regulation is that of improving regulatory 
quality. This aims at broader access to legislation, at systematic consultation, 
and at measuring the impact of new proposals. The EU has begun to codify and 
the Commission has learnt to consult better than in the past. Further, the issue of 
the costs of new proposals - especially for SMEs - has gained agenda status. In 
short, the Union is at the beginnings of this stage.
However, regulatory reform is complete only when there is a move from an 
approach based on individual instruments to a systematic approach, based on 
the entire life-cycle of regulatory policies (OECD 1997). This third stage, 
dubbed by the OECD regulatory management, is no longer centred round 
individual measures. Instead, it seeks coherence in the overall regulatory 
system. This can be achieved considering first and foremost whether regulation 
is truly the most effective way of solving the problems at issue. Other 
fundamental components of regulatory management are the analysis of 
interactions among different rules, the examination of direct and indirect 
implications for firms and citizens, the assessment of results, and the provision 
of transparency and accountability mechanisms. The point of arrival for 
regulatory management is not even to ‘use regulation better’, but to solve 
problems more effectively. The ‘regulator’ is replaced by problem-solving 
institutions, and regulation is seen as one of many policy instruments that can 
be creatively combined (OECD 1997).
Within the perspective of regulatory management, and bearing in mind the 
evolution towards independent administrative authorities, one of the challenges 




























































































and equip itself to govern networks ‘horizontally’, ensuring coherence and 
reliability to networks and implementation structures (Metcalfe 1996:5). In 
Metcalfe’s words, ‘the Commission’s core competence’ has to be defined in 
terms of developing capacities ‘to co-ordinate organizational networks’ rather 
than to seek to act directly: ‘teamwork instead of central control’ (Metcalfe 
1996:7).
In this respect, the models requiring considerable improvement are those of 
administrative partnerships, so far tried out with modest success in the 
management of the structural funds (Levy 1997). A similar approach could be 
experimented for fiscal authorities, checks on fraud, customs services, 
immigration policies, police services, and collaboration among government 
statistical organizations and the Commission (Metcalfe 1996:6; Laffan 1997). 
Stopping fraud30 is a task going well beyond asking, as the Commission’s 
checklists require, whether the regulation being proposed is abstractly flaw- 
proof. Fraud can be stopped in practice (not abstractly) by co-ordinating 
networks, from regions to national capitals. The European agencies themselves, 
finally, should interpret their role as co-ordinators of networks instead of as 
small ‘central’ regulators (Dehousse 1997:259).
From regulatory reform to administrative reform
The Commission is a complex organization which, in its daily conduct, 
resembles a political system where actors with varying preferences compete to 
control the agenda and the decisions. As explained above, many of the obstacles 
to regulatory reform have to do with the Commission’s low capacity for self-co- 
ordination. Even the most innovative methodologies, like the SLIM programme, 
have already encountered the problem of getting the administrative reform 
message down through all the Commissioners and DGs.
While countries in the OECD area have more or less successfully embarked on 
administrative reforms, the Commission has remained entirely impermeable to 
the ‘new public management’. Its predisposition to political activism, to 
inventing and launching new ideas - factors that reached their apogee in the 
years of Jacques Delors’s Presidency31 - have created low interest and little
30 There is no legal definition of ‘fraud’, so that the European Court of Auditors prefers to use 
the term ‘irregularity’ in its annual reports.
31 Stevens and Stevens (1996:15) note that Delors was ‘not interested in administrative 
reform, and his personal style was inimical to concepts of rational managerialism’. A so- 
called ‘screening exercise’ that is, a service by service assessment of the internal operation of 




























































































legitimacy (among Commission's officials) for administrative reform. Despite a 
few initiatives in the early 70s, such as the Spierenburg Report, the conclusion 
of Stevens and Stevens’ systematic survey is clearly negative: the Commission 
is ‘rigid, very hierarchic, fragmented, compartimentalised in complex ways, 
sometimes incoherent, and strongly male dominated’ (Stevens and Stevens 
1996:11). Anthropologists and public policy analysts add that the various DGs 
have now developed profoundly different administrative cultures’2 , which 
creates daily blocks, conflicts and poor internal co-ordination. My conclusion is 
that regulatory reform should go hand in hand with administrative reform. 
Perhaps the Santer Presidency, with its intention to do ‘less but better’, is in a 
favourable position to supply adequate leadership for the attempt to link 
administrative reform and regulatory reform.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper arises out of a series of questions on the importance of regulatory 
policy for the EU, the instruments for governing regulation developed by the 
European institutions, and what remains to be done. The EU has not, and 
probably will not in the future, followed in the footsteps of the European nation 
states, consolidated through the tax system and the Welfare state. But it is in 
regulatory policies that the Union has experienced truly exceptional 
development. If the EU is before anything else a political system that regulates 
(and not a system that taxes and offers social protection), the first priority of 
single market governance concerns the quality of regulation.
Facing the challenges of governing regulation, the EU has moved with some 
notable initiatives, within the framework provided by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. These initiatives range from checklists for 
preparing new proposals to the intensification of consultation, from the use of 
more flexible instruments (such as codes of conduct) to the attempt to place 
simplification of the administrative environment - particularly for SMEs - at the 
core of European policies, from simplification to the systematic assessment of 
existing norms.
Much ground is still to be covered, if we think only of how decisional 
procedures have been made more complex by the Maastricht Treaty without the 
recent Amsterdam Treaty having brought concrete progress. We are facing a 
paradoxical situation. On the one hand, growing complexity of decision-making
However, ‘the ultimate objective had to be the creation of a momentum towards reform, a 
momentum that in fact never materialised under Delors’ (Cini 1996:193).




























































































processes may even take legitimacy away from the Union’s actions. On the 
other, the European Union’s very democratic deficit creates a heightened need 
to seek the broadest possible consensus among Commission, European 
Parliament and Council. In turn, this creates complexity, poor transparency, 
incomprehensibility of processes, and finally erodes the legitimacy of European 
action.
But over and above decisional procedures, there remains the problem of a still 
far too limited view of the challenges ahead, centred on legislation (and not on 
regulation as public policy), and on simplification (but not on regulatory 
management). Further, the Commission demands new competencies for 
governing the single market, rather than focusing on administrative reform. On 
this Commissioner Monti is undoubtedly right to note that the Commission’s 
powers of verification and action against states not complying with internal 
market rules are much less effective than the Commission’s powers in 
competition policy (Agence Europe, 6 November 1997). Consequently, he 
demands new legal instruments to govern the internal market.
However, the notion of regulatory quality is something conceptually distinct 
from the concentration of powers in the hands of a specific regulator. The 
Commission has more need to reinvent itself as a network organization at the 
centre of horizontal, co-operative administrative mechanisms than to centralize 
new functions. In any case, the transfer of powers to Brussels makes sense only 
if accompanied by the building up of specific management capacities. This 
means tackling a theme - the administrative reform of the Commission - that has 
not yet reached adequate maturity of proposals and political commitment. The 
prospect should be to build up intelligent institutions capable of learning, not 
just to simplify legislation while keeping the institutions unchanged.
The governance of regulation is decisive for the functioning of the internal 
market and for the legitimacy of the European Union. An internal market ‘for 
thr citizens and the firms of the Union’ means democracy by results, 
transparency and capacity for resolving collective problems. These ends, in 
conclusion, justify mobilising the major political and administrative 
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